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A. The Principle of Distinction 
There are several cardinal principles lying at the root of the law of interna-tional armed conflict. Upon examination, none is more critical than the 
"principle of distinction. "I Undeniably, this overarching precept constitutes an in-
tegral part of modern customary intem ational 1aw.2 lt is also reflected in Article 48 
of the 1977 Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions ofl949. entitled "Ba-
sk rule," which provides that "the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distin-
guish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian 
objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only 
against military objectives. "3 
As is dear from the text, the pivotal bifurcation is between civilians and combat-
ants (and, as a corollary, between military objectives and civilian objects). It is 
wrong to present the dichotomy, as the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) sometimes does,4 in the form of civilians versus members of the armed 
forces. $ Apart from the fact that not every member of the anned forces is a combat-
ant (medical and religious personnel are excluded),6 civilians who directly partici-
pate in hostilities lose their civilian status fo r such time as they are acting in this 
fashion although they are not members of any anned forces (see infra Section B) . 
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It is almost axiomatic that, as a rule, all enemy combatants can be lawfully at-
tacked directly-at all times--during an international armed conflict. This can be 
done whether they are advancing, retreating or remaining stationary, and, as dis-
cussed later in this article, whether they are targeted in groups or individually.? 
There are, however, a number of caveats: (i) the attack must be carried out outside 
neutral territory, (ii) it is not allowed when a ceasefire is in effect, (iii) no prohib-
ited weapons may be used, (iv) no perfidious methods of warfare may be resorted 
to, (v) combatants are not to be attacked once they become hors de combat (by choice 
(surrendered personnel) or because they are wounded, sick or shipwrecked),8 and 
(vi) the attack must not be expected to cause excessive injury to civilians. 
The hallmark of civilian status in wartime is that, in contrast to combatants, ci-
vilians-as well as civilian objects--enjoy protection from attack by the enemy. In-
tentionally directing attacks against civilians (not taking direct part in hostili ties) 
or civilian objects is a war crime under Article 8(2)(b)(i)-(ii) of the 1998 Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court.9 
The term "attack" in this context means any act of violence, 10 understood in the 
widest possible sense (including a non -kinetic attack), as long as it entails loss of 
life, physical or psychological injury, or damage to property. Attacks do not include 
non-forcible acts, such as non-injurious psychological warfare. The line of division 
between what is permissible and what is not is accentuated by computer network 
attacks (CNA) . These would qualify as attacks within the accepted definition only 
if they engender-through reverberating effects-h uman casualties or damage to 
property (it being understood that a completely disabled computer is also damaged 
property).!1 
It is illegal to launch an attack the primary purpose of which is to spread terror 
among the civilian population.12 The prohibition is applicable even if the attacker 
has every reason to believe that such a terror campaign will shatter the morale of 
the civilian population-so that the enemy's determination to pursue the armed 
conflict will be eroded-and the war will be brought to a rapid conclusion (saving, 
as a result, countless lives on both sides). n Yet, an important rider is in order. What 
counts here is not the actual effect of the attack but its purpose or intent: an attack 
is not forbidden unless terrorizing civilians is its primary aim.14 Nothing precludes 
mounting an otherwise lawful attack against combatants and military objectives, 
even if the net outcome (due to resonating "shock. and awe") is the collapse of civil-
ian morale and the laying down of arms by the enemy. 
The principle of distinction excludes not only deliberate attacks against civil-
ians, but also indiscriminate attacks, i.e., instances in which the attacker does not 
target any specific military objective (due either to indifference as to whether the 
ensuing casualties will be civilians or combatants or, alternatively, to inability to 
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control the effects of the attack).l; A leading example is the launching by Iraq of 
Scud missiles against military objectives located in or near residential areas in Israel 
in 1991, notwithstanding the built-in imprecision of the Scuds which made accu-
racy in acquiring military objectives virtually impossible (and, in the event, no mil-
itary objective was struck). 
In regular inter-State warfare-where asymmetrical warfare is not part of the 
military equation-the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks is perhaps of even 
greater practical import than that of the ban of direct attacks against civilians. The 
reason is that, generally speaking, the armed forces of a civilized country are rarely 
likely nowadays to target civilians with premeditation. However, the prospect of 
the incidence of indiscriminate attacks-predicated, as it is, on lack of concern 
rather than on calculation-is much higher. A commonplace illustration would be 
a high-altitude air raid, carried out notwithstanding conditions of zero visibility 
and malfunctioning instruments for identifying preselected military objectives. 
Certainly, military training must tenaciously address the issue of indiscriminate at-
tacks if they are to be eliminated. 
The flip side of civilian objects (which are protected from attack) is military ob-
jectives (which are not). The authoritative definition of militaryob;ectives appears 
in Article 52(2) of Additional Protocol I: 
Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objects areconcerned, 
military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature,location, purpose 
or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial 
destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circwnstances ruling at the time, offers a 
definite military advantage. l6 
This definition is very open ended, if only because every civilian object-not ex-
cluding even a hospital or a church-is susceptible to use by the enemy for military 
purposes. Such use (or abuse) will turn even a hospital or a place of worship into a 
military objective, exposing it to a lawful attack under certain conditions. The only 
attenuating consideration is that, under Article 52(3) of Protocol I, in case of doubt 
the presumption should be that such a place is actually used for the normal pur-
poses to which it is dedicatedY 
It fo llows that the key to robust civilian protection lies, perhaps, less in the fun-
damental requirement of concentrating attacks on identifiable military objectives 
and more in the complementary legal condition of observing proportionality in 
the effects of the attack. This means, as prescribed in Article 51 (5)(b) of Protocol I, 
that-when an attack against a military objective is planned-incidental losses to 
civilians or civilian objects (usually called "collateral damage") must not be 
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expected to be "excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated."18Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that it will cause 
incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects which 
would be d early excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military ad-
vantage anticipated is a war crime under Artide 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court.19 
The expectation of excessive incidental losses to civilians or damage to civilian 
objects taints an attack as indiscriminate in character. Yet it must be borne in mind 
that not every inconvenience to civilians ought to be considered relevant. In war-
time. there are inevitable scarcities of foodstuffs and services. Indeed, food, doth-
ing. petrol and other essentials may actually be rationed; buses and trains may not 
run on time; curfews and blackouts may impinge on the quality oflife; etc. These 
do not count in the calculus of proportionality. Moreover, the military advantage 
anticipated from an attack must be viewed in a rather holistic fashion : when a 
large-scale attack is in progress. it is not required to assess every discrete segment in 
isolation from the overall picture.2o 
Undeniably, what is deemed excessive is often a matter of subjective appraisal, 
which takes place in the mind of the beholder (always remembering that the ap-
praisal must be done in a reasonable fashion ). The difficulty is that military advan-
tage and civilian casualties are like the metaphorical apples and oranges: a 
comparison between them is an art, not a science. Civilian losses can be counted, 
civilian damage can be surveyed and estimated, but how can you quantify a mili-
tary advantage on a measurable scale? Additionally, since the entire process is a 
matter of pre-attack evaluation and expectation, it must be acknowledged that it is 
embedded in probabilities. What is to be done if "the probability of gaining the 
military advantage and of affecting the civilian population is not 100 percent but 
lower and different"?21 
All the circumstances must be factored in. Thus, the bombardment of a hospital 
or a church used by the enemy may be given a green light if the actual number of 
patients or worshippers on site is negligible, whereas, should the numbers be dis-
proportionate, the attack may have to be aborted. However, there is a difference 
between the cases of. say, one mosque where the minaret is used by a single enemy 
sniper and another serving as a command and control center of an armored divi-
sion. Taking out the sniper must not entail a substantial civilian price tag, but the 
elimination of a key command and control center is a different matter. It has to be 
borne in mind that "excessive" is not interchangeable with "extensive." Some 
scholars take that position,22 but it is based on a misreading of the text.23 If the stra-
tegic and military value of a military objective is exceedingly high, significant col-
lateral civilian losses resulting from an attack may well be countenanced. 
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Any planned attack-and any commensurate estimate of the number of civil-
ians present in or near military objectives-must be based on up-to-date intelli-
gence. The "fog of war" is such that mistakes are unavoidable in every sizable 
military operation. When a legal analysis is made after the event, there is a built-in 
temptation to scrutinize the situation with the benefit of hindsight. But this temp-
tation must be strongly resisted. The proper question is not whether collateral 
damage to civilians proved to be excessive in actuality: it is whether collateral dam-
age could or should have been reasonably expected to be excessive at the time of 
planning, ordering or carrying out the attack. A reasonable expectation has to be 
linked to the data collated and interpreted at the time of action. Evidently, a valid 
evaluation of the state of affairs must be based on information that is current and 
not obsolete. If crucial information (say, about the absence of civilians from the vi-
cinity of a mili tary objective) is derived from a reconnaissance mission, the attack 
should follow soon thereafter since a long interval may mean that the facts on the 
ground have undergone a profound change.24 
Pursuant to Article 57(2)(a)(ii) of Additional Protocol I, those who plan or decide 
on an attack must take all feasib le precautions (taking into account all circum-
stances prevailing at the time), if not to avoid altogether, at least to minimize inci-
dental losses to civilians or civilian objects.25 Yet the aspiration to minimize 
collateral damage cannot trump all other military inputs. Minimize the costs to civil-
ians, yes, but not at all costs to the attacking force. There is no obligation incum-
bent on the attacker to sustain military losses only in order to minimize incidental 
losses to enemy civilians or civilian objects. "Survival of the military personnel and 
equipment is an appropriate consideration when assessing the military advantage 
of an attack in the proportionality context. "26 
Minimizing incidental losses or injury to civilians can be accomplished through 
the employment of precision-guided munitions (PGM)-where available-to tar-
get a military objective located in the midst of a densely populated residential area. 
The use of PGM enables the strike to be surgical, with little collateral damage ex-
pected to the surrounding civilians or civilian objects. As pointed out by Michael 
Schmitt, this is so not only because PGM are more accurate, but also because "the 
explosive charge needed to achieve the desired result is typically smaller than in 
their unguided counterparts. "21 
In order to achieve the same goal of sparing civilians and civilian objects from 
the effects of attacks, Article 57(3) of Protocol I sets forth that, if a choice is possible 
among several military objectives for obtaining a similar military advantage, the 
one expected to cause the least incidental civilian losses and damage should be se-
lected.28 But, again, the unfortunate truth is that it is often impossible to detennine 
187 
Distinction and Loss of Civilian Protection in International A rmed Conflicts 
with any degree of credibility whether the elimination of diverse military objectives 
would afford a similar military advantage. 
Other feasible precautions include-if circumstances permit-the issuance of 
effective advance warnings to civilians of an impending attack (in conformity with 
Article 57(2)(c) of Additional Protocol 129) . All the same, circumstances do not al-
ways permit the issuance of such warnings. Otherwise, surprise attacks would have 
had to be struck out of the military vocabulary. 
"The law of armed conflict singles out for special protection certain specified 
categories of civilians, either because they are regarded as especially vulnerable or 
on account of the functions they perform. "30 The first category is illustrated by 
women and children,3l and the second by civilian medical and religious person-
nel. 32 In the same vein, certain civilian objects-for instance, cultural property33 or 
places of worship34-also enjoy special protection. But the special protection must 
be looked upon as merely the icing on the cake: it adds some flavor but it does not 
really affect the core. Some additional elements--enhancing the range of the pro-
tection-are brought into play, for the benefit of the selected persons or objects, 
yet the most vital safeguards are granted to all civilians and civilian objects without 
fail. There is also a proviso: protection (even special protection) may be lost as a re-
sult of a failure to meet prescribed conditions, as stipulated by the law of interna-
tional armed conilict. 
B. Direct Participation in Hostilities 
Direct participation of a civilian in hostilities leads to loss of protection from attack 
ofthe person concerned (within the temporal limits of the activity in question). As 
promulgated in Article 51(3) of Protocoll, civilians enjoy a general protection 
against dangers arising from military operations "unless and for such time as they 
take a direct part in hostilities. "35 Occasionally, the reference is to "active" (instead 
of "direct") participation in hostilities,36 and at times either adjective is deletedY 
The bottom line is essentially the same:38 a person who takes part in hostilities loses 
his protection. There is no doubt that, as held by the Supreme Court ofIsrael (per 
President Barak) in the Targeted Killings caseof2006, this norm reflects customary 
internationallaw.39 
There is a consensus that a civilian can be targeted at such time as he is taking a 
direct part in hostilities.40 There is nevertheless a serious debate about taxonomy. 
For my part, I believe that by directly participating in hostilities a person turns into 
a combatant-indeed, more often than not, an unlawful combatant.'! On the 
other hand, the ICRC, while conceding that "[IJoss of protection against attack is 
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clear and uncontested, "42 adheres to the view that the status of that person remains 
one of a civilian. 
The difference of opinion about status has a p ractical consequence only when 
the person concerned is captured. 1 am inclined to think that, as an unlawful com-
batant, the person loses the general protection of the Geneva Conventions (except 
in occupied territories) and only enjoys some minimal safeguards, in conformity 
with human rights standards. The lCRC maintains that the general protection of 
civilian detainees under Geneva Convention (IV) applies also to civilians directly 
participating in hostilities. My own position is predicated on Article 5 of that Con-
vention, whereby-other than in occupied territories-those engaged in hostilities 
do not benefit from the privileges of the Convention, al though they still have to be 
treated with humanity and are entitled to a fair triaL43 
The words "for such time" appearing in Article 51(3) of Protocol l raise seri-
ous questions about their scope.44 The government of Israel has traditionally con-
tended that these words do not reflect customary international law, but the 
Supreme Court has utterly rejected that submission.45 The Court made it clear 
that a civilian who only sporadically takes a direct part in hostilities does not lose 
protection from attack on a permanent basis: once he disconnects himself from 
these activities, he regains his civilian protection from attack;-46 (although he may 
still be detained and prosecuted for any crime that he may have committed dur-
ing his direct participation in hostilities47) . 
The desire to confine the exposure of the civilian who directly participates in 
hostili ties to a finite space oftime makes a lot of sense. It is worthwhile to remem-
ber that many a rmed forces in the world incorporate large components of reserv-
ists who are called up for a prescribed period and are then released from service. A 
reservist is basically a civilian who wears the uniform of a combatant for a while 
and is then cloaked again with the mantle of a civilian. Surely, for such time as he is 
a combatant, a reservist can be attacked. Yet, before and after , qua civilian, he is ex-
empt from attack. The same consideration should apply grosso modo to other types 
of civilians turned combatants and vice versa. 
There are two salient riders added to the general proposition bytbe judgment in 
the Targeted Killings case. The first is that the cycle of direct participation in hostili-
ties commences at an early stage of preparation and deployment, continuing 
throughout the engagement itself, to cover also the disengagement and return 
phase;tS Although there are those who maintain that the expression "for such time" 
should be construed strictly as encompassing only the engagement itself, this claim 
is generally rejected.49 l (and others) take the position that, in demarcating the rele-
vant time span in the course of which the person concerned is actually taking part 
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in hostilities, it is permissible to go as far as reasonably possible both "upstream" 
and "downstream" from the actual engagement. 
The second rider is that while a person directly participating in hostilities more 
than once may still revert to a civilian status during an interval, this cannot be 
brought off when the hostile activities take place on a steadily recurrent basis with 
brief pauses (the so-called "revolving door" phenomenon).50 Those attempting to 
be "farmers by day and fighters by night" lose protection from attack even in the 
intermediate periods punctuating military operations. The same rationale applies 
if an individual becomes a member of an organized anned group (which collec-
tively takes a direct part in the hostilities): he would lose civilian protection for as 
long as that membership lasts. In the locution of the Court, an organized armed 
group becomes the "home" of the terrorist for whom a respite-interposing be-
tween acts of hostilities-merely means preparation for the next round.51 In prac-
tical terms, the individual in question may be targeted (see infra Section C), even 
when not personally linked to any specific hostile act-simply due to his member-
ship in such a group-as long as that membership continues. 
There is no doubt that the construct of direct participation in hostilities is not 
open ended, and it "is far narrower than that of making a contribution to the war 
effort."S2 Still, a whole range of activities can be identified as concrete examples of 
direct participation in hostilities. As the Supreme Court of Israel expounded, these 
include not only using firearms or gathering intelligence, but also acting as a guide 
to combatants, and, most pointedly, masterminding such activities through re-
cruitment or planning (in contradistinction to, e.g., merely donating money con-
tributions or selling supplies to combatants: the latter activities do not come within 
the ambit of direct participation in hostili ties).53 
Under Artide SO( 1) of Protocol I, " [ iJn case of doubt whether a person is a civil-
ian, that person shall be considered to be a civilian."$4 The provision is particularly 
germane to the issue of direct participation in hostilities. It is imperative to ensure 
that military units tasked with the mission of winnowing out civilians who engage 
in hostilities will not treat all civilians as targetable, "shooting first and asking ques-
tions later."% Additionally, the presence of civilians directly participating in hostil-
ities among the civilian population does not deprive the population at large of the 
protection from attack that it is entitled to.$6 
The theme of direct participation in hostilities has been under study for a num-
ber of years bya group of experts under the aegis of the ICRe. While the study has 
not yet been consummated, it has exposed a number of challenging questions and 
has led to lengthy debates. One hotly contested point will be discussed infra in de-
tail. But there is a host of thorny problems. By way of illustration, there are disputes 
regarding the different degrees of civilian contribution to electronic warfare, 
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ranging from the mere maintenance of military computers to playing the role of 
the "man in the loop" guiding-perhaps from a great distance-a military un-
manned aerial vehicle (UAV) or a CNA, with a view to causing death, destruction 
or damage. There are also arguments concerning the roles of civilian contractors 
who may offer purely logistical services (e.g., refueling military aircraft en route to 
a far-away armed conflict) but may also be carrying out paramilitary missions 
(such as guarding supply convoys) near the contact zone with the enemy. 
C. Targeted Killings of Civilians Directly Participating in Hostilities 
Hague Regulation 23(b) forbids the treacherous killing of enemy individuals,57 
and Article 37(1) of Additional Protocol I prohibits killing an adversary by resort 
to perfidy (defined as an act inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to 
believe that he is entitled to--or is obliged to accord-protection under the law of 
international armed conflict, with an intent to betray that confidence).s8 How-
ever, when perfidy is not in play, even the JCRC Model Manual concedes that an 
enemy individual combatant may be targeted (including a head of state who is the 
commander-in-chief).59 
There isa nexus between the question of whether a civilian is direct1yparticipat-
ing in hostili ties and the issue of targeted killing. Logic dictates that, since a com-
batant may be individually targeted for attack, the same rule should apply to a 
civilian who takes a direct part in hostilities (at such time as he is indulging in that 
activity). But scholars like to debate the deceptively simple hypothetical scenario of 
a civilian driving an ammunition truck to supply the armed forces. One view 
(maintained by General A.P. V. Rogers) is that this will not result in the forfeiture of 
civilian protection, although the presence of the civilian driver in the ammunition 
truck-a palpable military objective-will put him at risk should the truck be at-
tacked on his watch.60 To fully perceive what is at issue, it is necessary to flesh out 
the postulated sequence of events. Let us assume that the ammunition truck 
reaches a gas station and the driver parks the truck, going into a mini-mart to pur-
chase some refreshments. An enemy commando unit, lying in wait, is mounting an 
attack during that exact time frame. The question is: can the commandos attack 
only the ammunition truck (at its parking spot, which may be heavily guarded) or 
can they also kill or neutralize the driver when he is by himself inside the mini-
mart? General Rogers's position is dear cut: only the ammunition truck can be at-
tacked. As soon as the driver detaches himself from the truck, he sheds the risk and 
benefits from civilian protection. J (among others) disagree. We believe that it all 
depends on whether the script unfolds in geographic proximity to the front line or 
far away from it. If the location is at a great distance from the front line (say, in the 
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continental United States while the fron t line is in Afghanistan), the driver remains 
a civilian and runs a risk solely when he is in or near the ammunition truck. How-
ever, ifthe venue shifts and the ammunition truck is being driven in immediate lo-
gistical support of the military units deployed at the front line, the driver must be 
considered a civilian directly participating in hostili ties: he then loses protection 
from attack even when he steps out of the truck.6 1 In the Targeted Killings case, the 
Supreme Court of Israel has clearly endorsed the latter view.62 
In occupied territories, there is a preliminary issue related to targeted killings of 
civilians directly participating in hostilities, namely, whether the occupying power 
is capable of taking effective law enforcement measures vis-a.-vis such persons in 
lieu of slaying them. As President Barak stressed, detention of a person directly par-
ticipating in hostilities against the occupying power is the preferred step, provided 
that his arrest is feasible.ti3 1f detention is not a viable option, it must be recognized 
that a civilian taking a direct part in hostilities risks his life-like any combatant-
and is exposed to a lethal attack.64 Differently put, a strike targeting such a per-
son-and killing him-is permissible when non-lethal measures are either un-
available or ineffective. tiS 
Although the Supreme Court of Israel pronounced that a targeted killing of a 
terrorist in an occupied territory (when detention is not feasible) is lawful, the 
Court was adamant that whenever innocent civilians are present in the vicinity of 
the targeted individual and they are likely to be injured, the principle of propor-
tionality m ust be applied.66 The relevance of the principle of proportionality in the 
setting of targeted killings has come to the fore in Israel, because of a highly publi-
cized use of a one-ton bomb against a well-known Palestinian terrorist hiding in a 
residential area. There is a growing public sentiment that such a massive bomb 
should not have been used, since it was almost bound to cause excessive collateral 
damage to civilian bystanders. 
D. H uman Shields 
This raises the cognate issue of the use of civilian "human shields" intended to lend 
protection to combatants or military objectives. Article 28 of Geneva Convention 
(IV) states that "[t]he presence ofa protected person may not be used to render 
certain points or areas immune from military operations."67 For its part, Article 
51(7) of Protocol I reads, in part, that "[t]he presence or movements of the civilian 
population or individual civilians shall not be used to render certain points or areas 
immune from military operations, in particular in attempts to shield military ob-
jectives from attacks or to shield, favour or impede military operations."68 lrrefut-
ably, the prohibition of the use of civilians as human shields mirrors customary 
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internationallaw.69 Utilizing the presence of civilians or other protected persons to 
render certain points, areas or military forces immune from military operations is 
recognized as a war crime by Article 8(2)(b)(xxiii) of the Rome Statute.7o 
It is incontrovertible that when combatants (including civilians directly partici-
pating in hostilities) surround themselves by civilians, this is a breach of the law of 
international armed conflict. All the same, it is necessary to distinguish between 
voluntary and involuntary human shields. As the Supreme Court of Israel (per 
President Barak) held in the Targeted Killings case, whereas involuntary hwnan 
shields are victims, voluntary human shields are to be deemed civilians who take a 
direct part in hostilities.'l That being the case, voluntary human shields are 
targetable and, of course, they "are excluded in the estimation of incidental injury 
when assessing proportionality. "72 
What if, contrary to the law of international armed conflict, involuntary human 
shields are actually compelJed to screen a military objective? Article 51 (8) of Proto-
col I sets forth that a violation of the prohibition of shielding military objectives 
with civilians does not release a belligerent party from its legal obligations vis-a.-vis 
the civilians.73 What this means is that the principle of proportionality in attack re-
mains in effect. I do not deny that the principle of proportionality must still govern 
the planning of an attack against a military objective screened by involuntary civil-
ian human shields. However , in my opinion, the test of excessive injury to civilians 
must be relaxed in such exceptional circumstances. That is to say, to my mind, the 
appraisal of whether civilian casualties are excessive in relation to the military ad-
vantage anticipated must make allowances for the fact that, by dint of the large (al-
beit involuntal)') presence of civilians at the site of the military objective, the 
number of civilian casualties can be expected to be higher than usual. To quote 
Louise Doswald-Beck, "[ t]he Israeli bombardment of Beirut in June and July of 
1982 resulted in high civilian casualties, but not necessarily excessively so given the 
fact that the military targets were placed amongst the civilian population. "1~ This 
approach is confirmed by the 2004 UK Manual on the Law of Armed Conflict 
Any violation by the enemy of this rule [the prohibition of human shields] would not 
relieve the attacker of his responsibility to take precautions to protect the civilians 
aifC(:ted. but the enemy's unlawful activity may be taken into account in considering 
whether the incidental loss or damage was proportionate to the military advantage 
expected." 
Customary intemationallaw is certainly more rigorous than Protocol I on this 
point. It has traditionally been grasped that, should civilian casualties ensue from 
an illegal attempt to shield a military objective, their blood will be on the hands of 
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the belligerent party that abused them as human shields.76 The long and the short 
of it is that a belligerent party is not vested by the law of international armed con-
flict with the power to block an otherwise lawfuJ attack against military objectives 
by deliberately placing civilians in harm's way.77 
The prohibition of placing civilians as human shields around a military objec-
tive applies to all belligerent parties. Even though this has become a modus operandi 
typical of terrorists, there are muJtiple ways in which reguJar armed forces may be 
tempted to employ analogous tactics to facilitate military operations. The issue 
arose before the Supreme Court of Israel (per President Barak), in 2006, in the 
Early Warnitlgcase.78TheCourt had to determine the legality of an "Early Warning 
Procedure" (adopted by the Israel Defense Forces (lOF)) whereby, when a terrorist 
has been cornered and besieged, a local resident would be encouraged to volunteer 
(provided that no harm to the messenger was anticipated) in order to relay a warn-
ing and a call to surrender so as to avoid unnecessary bloodshed.79 The "Early 
Warning Procedure" drew criticism from outside observers80 and it was nullified 
by the Court. President Barak-relying on Article 28 of Geneva Convention (IV) 
and on Article 51 (7) of Protocol I (although Israel is not a contracting party to Pro-
tocol I)-stressed that the IOF was not allowed to use protected persons as human 
shields and that, therefore, the assistance of a local resident could certainly not be 
required coercive1y.81 But what about assistance offered voluntarily in circum-
stances where this is not expected to place the person concerned in jeopardy? Presi-
dent Barak ruJed against the "Early Warning Procedure" on four grounds: (i) 
protected persons must not be used as part of the military effort of the occupying 
power, (ii) everything must be done to separate the civilian population from com-
bat operations, (iii) voluntary consent in these circumstances is often suspect, and 
(iv) it is not possible to tell in advance whether the activity of the protected person 
puts him in danger.82 
Generally speaking, President Barak's reasoning is persuasive. Yet, he did not 
explain why such assistance cannot be offered by a close relative---especially, a 
mother or a father--{)f a terrorist besieged in a building that is about to be stormed 
(with the likelihood of death in action of the terrorist), when the initiative is taken 
by, for example, the parent who begs to be given a chance to persuade the besieged 
son to surrender and save his life. 8) In such exceptional circumstances, there is little 
if any danger to the life of the parent, and humanitarian considerations actually tip 
the balance in favor of allowing the requested intercession to take place. 
In conclusion, this article should show that, although the protection of civilians 
is a basic tenet of the international law of armed conflict, a civilian cannot take that 
protection for granted. There are many ways in which civilian protection will not 
render practical assistance, and a civilian wouJd become a victim of war 
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inadvertently (due to collateral damage). But, above all, civilian protection can be 
lost if the person who purports to benefit from it crosses a red line by directly par-
ticipating in hostilities. He may then be targeted, and this need not be done in an 
anonymous fashion. Absent perfidy, the bullet that kills him may lawfully have his 
name engraved on it. 
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